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chapter 3
The Polish Elites’ Struggle for Recognition of the 
Experience of Communism in the European Union
Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach
The course of history placed Poles outside the reflections on the shape of the 
political processes in Western Europe after the Second World War. Neverthe-
less, the origins of various Polish concepts and visions of the country’s place 
in Europe can be traced back to the 15th and 16th centuries and the Golden 
Age of the Jagiellonian Commonwealth. Throughout the difficult years of 
their  troubled history, the Polish elites referred to Western Europe as an impor-
tant cultural source and a civilisation they belonged to. It was also during the 
 period of Communism that – especially for the democratic opposition – West-
ern  Europe was a source of inspiration and resources.1 Europe,  particularly 
Western Europe, was then to Poles a very significant point of reference and one 
which was essential for their collective identity. Whether as a paradise of wealth 
and higher level of consumption, for Poles who dreamt of a better life, or as a 
land of freedom and high culture, for those Poles who had more intellectual 
and cultural ambitions, Western Europe was a dreamland, on the other side of 
the Iron Curtain, accessible only sporadically on occasions of infrequent tour-
ist or professional visits. When Communism ended in Poland and Central and 
Eastern Europe (cee), Poles eagerly and almost immediately declared their 
intention to ‘return to Europe’. Western Europe, or simply ‘the West’, as it was 
then commonly referred to, was seen in Poland as a largely undifferentiated, 
homogenized area of freedom, democracy and prosperity. Little was known 
about the internal diversity of Western Europe, and even less about the differ-
ent problematic issues related to collective memory, sensitivities and conflicts 
of interpretation of European history. An example of the difficult lessons of 
European conflicts of attitudes and interpretations which Poles had to learn 
was the experience of the war against Iraq in 2003, in which some eu member 
states supported the usa, while others refused to participate in the invasion. In 
the decision of the latter group, anti-American sentiments played an important 
1 Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach, “Between Old Fears and New Challenges. The Polish 
Debate of Europe”, in European Stories. Intellectual Debates in National Contexts, ed. Justine 
Lacroix, Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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role. Poles had to understand that they might have to take sides and choose be-
tween different Western countries, which, before 1989, were seen from the Pol-
ish perspective as the unified ‘West’. The situation also stressed the importance 
of how the actions of political actors were perceived and received by Western 
counter partners, and it displayed the interactivity of European politics.
The research on the debate on the future of Europe highlights the fact that 
it has seemed very difficult for Poles, both ordinary people and intellectuals, 
to think in terms of a common, European ‘we’.2 European interests were previ-
ously not perceived as being equal to Polish interests and solidarity did not 
extend beyond national borders. Poles tend to think of the eu predominantly 
from a national point of view. The eu is good if and when it contributes to 
Poland’s strength, prosperity and security. One might say that Europe is seen in 
Poland as an instrumental value, not a value in itself. A pro-European position 
considers European integration as good for Poland, while an anti-European 
approach believes that European integration deprives Poland of values essen-
tial for its identity and well-being – mainly political sovereignty, tradition and 
Roman Catholicism (identified here as the essence of Polishness). At the same 
time, however, Poles express high levels of optimism as regards the eu, and the 
European component is crucial for the Polish collective identification.
The focus of this chapter is on how the experience of Communism still 
shapes the behaviour of Polish elites and politicians and how they use the 
memory of Communism in order to claim recognition within the eu. How has 
the specific historical experience of Communism influenced the reflection on 
Europe, identification with Europe and perception of this political project in 
Poland? How have political actors in the eu perceived such claims? The eastern 
eu enlargement has challenged the established Western European notions of 
the memory of the Second World War and particularly the insignificance of the 
Communist crimes vis-à-vis those of the Nazi regime. As Maria Mälksoo claims 
‘in spite of the institutional unification of the “two halves of Europe” after the 
end of the Cold War, the consolidation of the legacy of the Second World War 
in general, and that of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe in particular, is long 
overdue. Europe has remained divided when it comes to the political, moral, 
and legal evaluation of the criminal inheritance of the other totalitarian tradi-
tion in the history of the twentieth century – that of Soviet Communism’.3 The 
problem with the recognition of the totalitarian nature of Soviet Communism 
2 Góra, Mach, Between Old Fears; Magdalena Góra, “Solidarity of Citizens and of States in the 
European Union”, Visegrad Insight 2:4 (2013).
3 Maria Mälksoo, “The Discourse of Communist Crimes in the European Memory Politics 
of World War ii”, (paper presented at the Ideology and Discourse Analysis conference 
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and its crimes in cee has already attracted attention, even though it still raises 
many controversies. In this chapter we will use the concept of recognition in 
order to analyze how it is utilized for political purposes in everyday European 
politics. The concept of recognition allows capturing the dialogical nature of 
the processes in European politics and focus not only on the claimants but also 
on the reception of claims.
In the following sections we will first provide a theoretical background of 
our analysis and present the concept of recognition and its role in contem-
porary European politics. In the second part we will explain how the memory 
of Communism and historical politics has functioned on the domestic level 
in Poland. In the final part we will present the analysis of debates from the 
 European Parliament, where claims for recognition of the historical experi-
ence of Poland have stirred up fervent debates.
 Recognition, Collective Identity, Redistribution and  
Collective Memory
Since the 1960s scholars dealing with the functioning of contemporary societ-
ies have been increasingly focusing on the concept of recognition. The process 
of recognition is a crucial element of one’s subjectivity and a foundation of 
a process of identification understood in relational terms when the other is 
necessarily involved in a mutual relationship. According to Charles Taylor’s 
observation, ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back 
to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-
recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’.4 Recog-
nition is therefore relational and dialogical in its nature. The reception of the 
claims for recognition and response to it matters. Recognition is not only about 
‘an expectation of the confirmation of abilities and value by the other’,5 it is 
also about socialization and social integration ‘through the regulated forms 
 ‘Rethinking Political Frontiers and Democracy in a New World Order’, Roskilde University, 
Denmark, 8–10 September 2008), 1.
4 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Multiculturalism. The Examination the Politics 
of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25.
5 Christian Lazzeri and Alain Caillé, “Recognition Today. The Theoretical, Ethical and Political 
Stakes of the Concept”, in Recognition, Work, Politics. New Directions in French Critical Theory, 
ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), 92.
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of recognition’.6 Recognition allows us then to grasp the nature of legitimized 
social order being such ‘only to the degree that they [societies] are in a posi-
tion to guarantee reliable relations of mutual recognition at various levels’.7 
Therefore, in the increasingly diverse societies of Western Europe, the concept 
of recognition has become a tool to better grasp the dynamics of relationships 
between various groups: ethnic and national minorities (also immigration 
groups), women, sexual minorities etc. Ultimately, it is worth mentioning that 
the thinkers who introduced and developed the concept of recognition also 
had a normative idea in mind, namely how to build a just, modern society.8 In 
this regard, the concept of recognition ‘defines the conditions of a just society 
through the aim of recognizing the individual dignity of all individuals’.9
This normative aspect has led to the emergence of the politics of recognition 
at least since the 1960s, defined as a need to deal with the existence of multiple 
identities and recognition of the diversity of belongings in the contemporary 
world.10 The issue of recognition becomes central in contemporary societies 
and assumes that it is ‘a complex multilateral web of relations and their affects 
among actors of different types’.11 This multiplicity of dimensions and actors 
in turn has resulted in the introduction of the concept of  recognition order, 
understood as ‘a framework within which individuals and groups are learn-
ing to see themselves as recognised with respect to certain characteristics’.12 
The recognition order was firstly conceptualized and analyzed within nation 
state frames of reference and in such a context the politics of recognition was 
mostly analyzed.
The politics of recognition deals with the question of how domestic institu-
tions such as schools, universities, mass media, health care institutions and 
the army respond to and accommodate the necessity of the recognition of di-
verse social composition.13 It results in an important dilemma of politics of 
6 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice”, Acta Socio-




10 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts 
( Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Taylor, “The Politics”.
11 James Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Distribution”, Constellations 7:4 (2001), 474.
12 Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in Fraser N., 
Honneth A., Redistribution of recognition? A political-philosophical exchange (London, 
New York: Verso, 2003) quoted in John Erik Fossum, “Conceptualizing the eu’s Social Con-
stituency”, European Journal of Social Theory 8:2 (2005), 125.
13 Amy Gutman, “Introduction”, in Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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 recognition, stressing that in principle the public sphere should be ‘difference 
blind’ in order to fulfil the principle of recognition.14 Introducing reflection in 
the politics of recognition allows one to reconsider the fundamental condition 
on which contemporary liberal democracy is built in the context of increas-
ingly diverse societies. This reflection is especially potent in the context of the 
politics of recognition entering the supranational arena, particularly within 
the eu. This will be developed further in the next section.
However, the politics of recognition also highlights the important as-
pect of redistribution, as famously raised by Nancy Fraser and debated with 
 Honneth.15 Social movements demanding recognition – such as the women’s 
or African American rights movements – have also focused on more just redis-
tribution. Fraser argues that these are ‘two dimensions of justice’ in contempo-
rary societies that need to be addressed. She claims, ‘it is my general thesis that 
justice today requires both redistribution and recognition, as neither alone is 
sufficient’.16 In order to establish what the relationship between them is, Fraser 
makes the assumption that recognition is a matter of justice: ‘One should say, 
rather, that it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status 
of full partners in social interactions simply as a consequence of institution-
alized patterns of interpretation and evaluation in whose construction they 
have not equally participated and that disparage their distinctive character-
istics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them’.17 As a consequence, 
 misrecognition is a social phenomenon, which influences the position in social 
relations including the redistribution. Fraser therefore proposes a bivalent con-
ception of justice, which ‘does not treat recognition as a good to be  distributed, 
nor distribution as an expression of recognition. Rather, a bivalent conception 
treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimen-
sions of, justice, while at the same time encompassing both of them within a 
broader, overarching framework’.18 We argue that the main link between the 
two is through identity.19 As we have already stated above – the recognition 
is about including various narratives in mainstream collective identification 
and treating them as just and appropriate. Similarly, including certain groups 
14 Taylor, “The Politics”, 40.
15 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution of recognition? A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange (London, New York: Verso 2003).
16 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, 
and Participation”, (the Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Delivered at Stanford Univer-
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in mainstream identification processes equips them with the legitimization to 
claim for redistribution. This two-dimensional aspect of recognition claims is 
connected with identity-oriented elements and economic demands within the 
recognition order and will serve as the theoretical basis for analyzing the aims 
of the recognition claims of Polish political actors within the eu.
The debates on the politics of recognition have also entered the supranation-
al level, especially in the context of the European integration. Scholars argue 
that, at least since the beginning of the 1990s, the politics of recognition devel-
oped mainly within the national framework has also entered the supranational 
level.20 This is connected with the growing significance of policy-making and 
redistribution within the eu. Therefore, argues John Erik Fossum, the eu can 
become a new, broader recognition order if citizens and political actors seek 
recognition not only in the nation states but also in supranational arenas.21 
Fossum also argues that this may lead to the creation of the eu as a social 
constituency, meaning that the eu will develop beyond a merely functional 
order and will transform into a full-fletched polity, especially for its citizens. 
According to him, this transformation has already started, as was specifically 
visible during the 2004 eu enlargement. After the enlargement of the eu, new 
political actors from cee started to express their particular, historically deter-
mined and hegemonic (in terms of distribution of power) demands of equal 
recognition.22 The new claims and new perspective brought by meps from cee 
regarding the recognition of the Christian elements of European identity and 
politics could serve as an example.23
Such demands for recognition within the eu serve several purposes. Firstly, 
they focus on the recognition of certain collective identifications within Eu-
ropean mainstream narrative and as a result claim belonging to the European 
community. In the context of this chapter, political actors from cee demand 
recognition of their unique historical experience of the Second World War and 
Communism in order to receive equal status in the eu. Secondly, derived from 
the identity-oriented aspect of recognition, the demand allows actors to claim 
fair redistribution within the eu political system. It is an especially important 
20 Zenia Hellgren and Barbara Hobson, “Gender and ethnic minority claims in Swedish and 
eu frames. Sites of Multilevel Political Opportunities and Boundary Making”, in Gender 
politics in the expanding European Union: mobilization, inclusion, exclusion, ed. Silke Roth 
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).
21 Fossum, “Conceptualizing”.
22 Ibid.
23 Magdalena Góra and Katarzyna Zielińska, “Defenders of faith? Victims of secularization? 
Polish politicians in the European Parliament”, Religion, State, Society 42:2–3 (2014).
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aspect because within the eu new injustices may emerge and, as a result, a 
new axis of conflict could form.24 The important aspect of the claims for rec-
ognition is their reception. It is a dialogical, interactive construction where 
the success of the claimant depends on whether or not claims are received as 
 legitimate. Therefore it is crucial not only to look at the claimants but also at 
the reception of the claims.
The specific aspect of theoretical debate on recognition concerns the role 
of the past experience of groups in their demands for recognition and redis-
tribution. Various groups claim the recognition of their unique historical ex-
perience and heritage. As Carlos Closa puts it, ‘Recognition of memory in a 
given community restores persons’ dignity by means of policies which take 
into account their claims. Recognition thus is an essential component of poli-
cies of memory and politics of memory are the struggles for recognition of 
memory claims’.25 It is an old dilemma in democratic societies how to recog-
nize various, different and often contradicting narratives of past experiences 
and how to deal with the attempts to falsify history. Especially in cee, strong 
conflicts  of memory frequently arise.26 This is especially significant due to 
the role of memory in shaping dominant collective identifications in contem-
porary societies. In the European context, political actors from cee demand 
 recognition of their experience and suffering. According to this concept, if Eu-
ropeans want to construct collective identity on equal terms, various histori-
cal  experiences – also those of Communism – must be taken as equally valid. 
As Carlos Closa states, ‘in the view of its [equal recognition] proponents, the 
dominant narrative on European history (as reflected by education, symbolic 
practices and awareness initiatives) reflects predominantly (and for some only 
exclusively) the experiences of the Western part of the continent whilst the 
historical experience of Central and Eastern European countries has not been 
included’.27 Maria Mälksoo, on the other hand, has stressed that the cee ac-
tors make ‘vocal claims of “equal subjectivity” in the European mnemopoliti-
cal field as well as reverberate their increasing sense of confidence about the 
24 John Erik Fossum and Marit Eldholm, “Conceptualising (and tentatively mapping) the 
eu’s social constituency”, in Civic Resources and the Future of the European Union, ed. Ire-
neusz Pawel Karolewski, Viktoria Kaina (London: Routledge, 2012).
25 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”, 6.
26 Siobhan Kattago, “Memory, Pluralism and the Agony of Politics”, Journal of Baltic Studies 
41:3 (2010); Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, History, Memory and Politics in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Memory Games (Basingstoke: Plagrave Macmillan, 2013).
27 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”, 12.
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density of their ties to the Euro-Atlantic security community’.28 Both scholars 
link ‘equal’ claims to the sense of belonging in community along the lines of 
recognition theory.
There is growing research on the content of these claims. Closa lists sev-
eral elements raised in the European public sphere when equal recognition is 
demanded. The dominant demands are for condemnation of the communist 
regimes: the criminalization of the denial of so-called totalitarian crimes, the 
recognition of commemoration dates which are linked to facts of memory of 
cee countries, and the teaching of history integrating cee perspectives and fi-
nally focusing on memorialization policies.29 Mälksoo focuses on the  demand 
for the recognition of the criminal nature of Soviet Communism and the rec-
ognition of its crimes as genocide.30 Other scholars analyzing the politics of 
memory of Polish actors on the European level stress three main areas where a 
unique perspective is used most frequently: the insistence of the commemora-
tion of the Katyń massacre, the specific Polish experience under Communism, 
and the special relations with Poland’s new Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, 
 Belarus and Lithuania).31 Recently scholars have also focused on the way po-
litical actors from new member states became memory entrepreneurs in order 
to promote their claims.32
During the process of eu accession, one of the most important topics high-
lighted by Western actors was connected with the narrative on the Second 
World War. Specifically in the case of Poland it concerned the Holocaust re-
membrance and the reintroduction to the public discourse of the complicated 
relations between Poles, Jews and the Nazi and Soviet occupiers. Another topic 
has covered the forced transfers of population – particularly German – after 
the Second World War. These attempts were perceived as a Europeanization 
of the discourse on history in Europe. For years, however, the process of the 
Europeanization of historical discourse was asymmetrical – the demands were 
directed mostly at the cee countries.
28 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”, 7.
29 Closa, “Negotiating the Past”.
30 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
31 Matt Killingsworth, Małgorzata Klatt and Stefan Auer, “Where Does Poland Fit in Europe? 
How Political Memory Influences Polish meps’ Perceptions of Poland’s place in Europe”, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11:4 (2010).
32 Laure Neumayer, “Integrating the Central European Past into a Common Narrative: The 
Mobilizations Around the ‘Crimes of Communism’ in the European Parliament”, in: Jour-
nal of Contemporary European Studies 23:3 (2015).
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In this chapter we will look at the other direction of the process of 
 Europeanization of history discourse when political actors from cee direct 
certain claims for recognition to and their reception by the Western European 
actors.
 Collective Memory and Historical Politics in Poland  
after Communism
Polish national identity, collective memory, political culture and the  perception 
of Europe are a result of Poland’s unique location between East and West and 
specific historical processes. The geopolitical location and strong identification 
with Western European civilization versus the East have resulted in constant 
tensions in the region and developed a strong sensitivity towards the past in 
Poland.33 The experience of the Nazi occupation and later of the Communism 
rule has contributed to the sense of betrayal by the West and strengthened the 
endangered collective identity.
Since 1989 the issue of dealing with the past has resurfaced. First and fore-
most, as for previous centuries, the turn to the West as a source of security, 
modernization and prosperity has become a widely accepted policy priority. 
The initial political idea of how to deal with the heritage of Communism was 
the concept of a ‘thick line’ promoted by the first democratic Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He claimed: ‘We split away the history of our recent past 
with a thick line. We will be responsible only for what we have done to help 
extract Poland from her current predicament, from now on’.34 It was meant to 
allow the focus to shift more to the current challenges of the devastated coun-
try and promote a fresh start. However, it was very soon interpreted as a call for 
cutting off what had happened before 1989, avoiding de-Communisation and 
33 Joanna Pękacz, “‘Antemurale of Europe’. From the History of National Megalomania In 
Poland”, History of European Ideas 20:1–3 (1995); Georges Sanford, “Overcoming the Bur-
den of History in Polish Foreign Policy”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Poli-
tics 19:3 (2003); Janusz Tazbir, “Europejska wspólnota obronna”, in Europa. Drogi integracji, 
ed. Aniela. Dylus (Warszawa: Studium Generale Europa, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana 
Wyszyńskiego, 1999).
34 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, “Wnioski Prezydenta prl o odwołaniu ze stanowiska Prezesa Rady 
Ministrów Czesława Kiszczaka oraz o powołanie na stanowisko Prezesa Rady Ministrów 
Tadeusza Mazowieckiego”, in Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej X Kadencji, Sprawozdanie 
Stenograficzne z 6 Posiedzenia Sejmu, 23 i 24 sierpnia 1989, Warszawa 1989, accessed August 
2014, http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenogramyX.nsf/0/259278CD28DE3BBDC1257D20002CC6
FD/$file/006_000006771.pdf (authors’ own translation).
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not punishing those responsible for crimes committed during Communism. 
Very soon the right-wing parties which emerged from the Solidarity camp 
started to question Mazowiecki’s approach and criticize the Round Table ac-
cords as a means for the systemic transition into democracy. They perceived it 
as a rotten compromise allowing the Communist elites to regain power within 
the economic realm and they demanded lustration. There were several at-
tempts to pursue this, none of which ever fully succeeded.35
At the end of the first democratic decade new political forces such as Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – Law and Justice), founded in 2001 and based on the 
previous centre-right wing parties, started to call for a new opening and the 
pursuit of historical politics in the country. It was a result of the harsh criticism 
of the first decade of democracy in Poland: ‘this project consisted of several 
clear elements: from the idea of moral pluralism and the neutrality of the state, 
with the conviction of the imitative nature of the Polish transformation, the 
recognition of a fast modernisation as a major goal (including cultural mod-
ernisation), stemming from the lack of trust and reluctance to the national 
tradition, the ban on de-communisation and so on. (…) It did not pay much at-
tention to the question of the affirmative sharpening of identity and collective 
memory’.36 So this affirmative shaping of Polish collective memory became a 
political goal to be pursued on the domestic level. Historical politics became 
a central element of the political programme of PiS and also became popular 
among other centre and right-wing parties in Poland. The content of this af-
firmative shaping concerned predominantly the period of the Second World 
War and specifically the way relations between German and Soviet occupiers, 
the Polish population and Jews were interpreted. A good illustration for this 
wasthe two fierce debates following the publication of the Jan T. Gross books 
in 2001 and 2006.37
35 Natalia Letki, “Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe”, Europe-Asia 
Studies 54:4 (2002); Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak and Brigid Fowler, “Explaining 
Lustration in Eastern Europe: ‘A Post-communist politics approach’”, sei Working Pa-
per 62 (2003), accessed August 2014 https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file 
.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-62.pdf&site=266; Lavinia Stan (ed.), Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union. Reckoning with the communist past (London: Routledge, 
2009).
36 Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo słowo/obraz teryto-
ria, 2005), 8.
37 Tomasz J. Gross, Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Tomasz J. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Po-
land After Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006).
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The second major focus of historical politics in Poland has been dealing with 
the legacy of Communism. Apart from the first attempts at lustration in 1992 
and 1997/8, the new post-Solidarity government initiated in 1997 the creation 
of Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (ipn – the Institute of National Remembrance) 
whose main duty was to gather documents, hold inquiries into Nazi and Com-
munist crimes and to educate people.38 The historical politics and ipn itself 
raised high emotions in domestic politics: ‘ipn became a most important, visi-
ble and controversial institution of contemporary Poland’.39 Yet, the additional 
goal of historical politics in Poland was directed outside the country, especially 
at the European institutions and states, with special attention to the European 
Parliament as the agora of the eu. As the leader of PiS (at that time in opposi-
tion) said in a debate on foreign policy in the Polish parliament in 2003:
And the next issues are very important to our status, but our activities 
are – let’s say – not enough, if not non-existent. These are historical is-
sues, the issue of the dignity of our nation; it is how we assess the Second 
World War, and all this connected with the great liberation from Com-
munism (applause). There is tendency in Europe, not to mention the usa, 
where it is even stronger, to equal guilt and contributions from this pe-
riod, also from the period of the Second World War. Recently such a decla-
ration was made by the European Parliament. It is about, let’s admit that, 
treating all equally – all suffered losses, all committed crimes. And on the 
other hand there is a well-known defamatory campaign against our na-
tion as regards its “involvement”, and I use inverted comas here, in holo-
caust; its alleged co-responsibility for this most horrible crime of the war. 
Now our actions to prevent this are definitely too weak. We can even talk 
about the participation in such defamatory actions of some – not of Pol-
ish diplomacy but – of Polish elites (applause). We need to be clear and 
decided, we need to undertake all possible actions in order to prevent it.40
Similar statements were made frequently, especially in debates related to 
the role in the eu and especially about relations with Germany. In 2005, for 
 instance, another leader of PiS stated: ‘I want to thank for those very clear and 
38 Dariusz Stola, “Poland’s Institute of national Remembrance: A Ministry of Memory?”, 
in The Convolutions of Historical Politics, ed. A. Miller, M. Lipman (Budapest: Central 
 European University Press, 2012).
39 Ibid., 48.
40 Jarosław Kaczyński, “Wypowiedź w debacie”, in Informacja rządu na temat polskiej pol-
ityki zagranicznej w 2003 roku. 4 kadencja, 40 posiedzenie, 2 dzień (22 January 2003), 
 accessed August 2014 http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf (authors’ own translation).
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so far unsaid words on the issue of historical truth and on the issue of German 
responsibility for the crimes committed during the Second World War. If such 
words were spelled out regularly and firmly, parts of the problems in Polish-
German relations would not be present today’.41 Such an approach – to fight 
for the historically understood dignity and honour of the nation – has a long 
tradition in Poland. It stems from the gentry which dominated the political 
culture and difficult past on the one hand, and connects to the vivid memory 
of the glorious times of the Jagiellonian Commonwealth on the other. What 
is especially interesting for this chapter is that such an approach has been 
pursued by significant political actors in Poland not only on the domestic 
level but also that it also had a very clear connection to the debate on the 
role of Poland in the eu on the eve of its enlargement to the East. The peak 
of the attempts to deal with the past, especially of the Communist legacy, was 
reached in the first years following the eu enlargement. In 2005, PiS formed a 
ruling coalition (in office until the pre-term elections in 2007) with the right-
wing Liga Polskich Rodzin (lpr – League of Polish Families) as well as the 
populist Samoobrona rp (srp – Self-defence). As regards historical politics, 
the main elements of this government’s approach on the domestic level were 
focused on lustration. A new law was adopted in 2006, amended in 2007 and 
later rejected by the Constitutional Court. On the international and European 
level, the main aim was to receive recognition of the totalitarian nature of 
Communism and actions against the alleged defamation of the Polish nation. 
It is important to note that such an approach to historical politics was sup-
ported by PiS and lpr as well as by other political parties from the centre-
right wing groups. The second most important party on the Polish political 
scene, the centre-right wing Platforma Obywatelska (po – Civic Platform) only 
 partially – especially its conservative wing – subscribed to such an agenda. 
The left wing and liberal parties and liberal circles openly opposed lustration 
attempts and were much more cautious about the historical politics coined in 
the 2005–2007 period. Ultimately, the Polish historical politics which gained 
attention and strength in domestic politics also become visible in the Euro-
pean arena, especially in the European Parliament which was perceived as an 
agora of the European Union.
Polish representation in the European Parliament in the 6th and 7th term 
in office was the largest among the new member states and consisted of 50–54 
meps (depending on the term in office). In both the 2004 and 2009 elections, 
41 Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski, “Wypowiedź w debacie”, in Informacja Ministra Spraw 
 Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2005 roku, 4 kadencja, 96 
posiedzenie, 3 dzień (21 January 2005), accessed August 2014 http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/ 
Debata4.nsf (authors’ own translation).
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centre-right wing and right wing parties won the majority of the votes. The 
winner of both elections, po, joined the Group of European People’s Party 
(Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (epp-ed) together with Pol-
skie Stronnictwo Ludowe (psl – Polish People’s Party). The two other winners 
in 2004: lpr and PiS joined the right-wing party groups. PiS went for Union for 
a Europe of the Nations Group (uen) and remained in this party for the en-
tire term in office, while the lpr at first joined Independence and Democracy 
Group (Ind/dem). Yet the party split and the majority of the ten lpr meps 
went to other national formations (mostly PiS) and, as a result, joined uen in 
the ep. Similarly srp split (four meps out of six left) as well as psl (three meps 
out of four left). The left-wing parties joined Group of the Party of European 
Socialists (pes), and liberal formation Unia Wolności (uw – Freedom Union) 
joined Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (alde). 
During the elections for the 7th ep (2009–2014) the right-wing (lpr) and popu-
list (srp) parties did not cross the electoral threshold. Their electorate went 
mostly to PiS which doubled its result in 2009. PiS joined the newly created 
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ecr).
In the following we will provide an analysis of Polish meps’ interventions 
in and reception of the 6th and 7th ep. In order to do so we have selected 11 
debates devoted to topics connected with commemoration of totalitarianism, 
programmes financing such commemorations etc. However, we have also in-
cluded debates concerning issues not directly related with collective memory 
or the past. These are debates focusing on issues connected with solidarity and 
redistribution in the eu (see Annex 1).
The purpose of this selection was to analyze the claims for recognition in 
the context of the debates on history and memory, but also in less obvious 
situations. The relevant claims were analyzed as regards their content (what 
should be recognized?), the addressee (by whom?) and for what reason (why 
should it be recognized?). Finally our interest was the reception of the claims. 
It must be noted, however, that the empirical material limits the way that the 
responses to the analyzed claims are captured. The plenary debates in the ep 
allow dialogical exchange of opinions, but the limited time allocated to speak-
ers and the fact that meps rarely reappear during the same debate are imping-
ing the interactivity and dialogue between meps.
 Recognition in European Parliament debates
An analysis of the debates shows that the focus of Polish meps on the recogni-
tion of their historical, unique experience was most important immediately 
after the eu enlargement in 2004. During the 6th term in office of the ep it 
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seems that debates on the crimes of Soviet Communism were more frequent 
and heated. The significance of these issues seems to have faded away in the 
ep’s 7th term in office, although claims for recognition remained important. 
This is probably because the main purpose of the claims was, for those making 
them, to find and assert their own position within the eu and confirm their 
own identity as belonging, although equipped with a different – but equally 
important – historical experience. That had to change with time, and such 
claims became less frequent when political actors started feeling more assured 
in the new institutions. In other words, the discussions in the eu on the past 
and memory seemed to follow from the enlargement. Moreover it is impor-
tant to note that the debates were initiated by the memory entrepreneurs from 
cee.42
The interesting issue remains as to who raised the claims for recognition 
most often among Polish meps. The most actively involved in debates and 
most often using the recognition claims were meps from the centre and right-
wing party groups in the ep – uen, Ind/Dem, epp-ed and ecr. The meps from 
alde and pes participated in these debates much less frequently and used the 
recognition claims even less. This is in tune with the analysis of the histori-
cal politics on the national level. The meps using recognition arguments came 
from parties that were devoted to puruse historical politics on the domestic 
political scene, such as PiS, lpr and partially po.
 Soviet Communism Equals Totalitarianism
One of the main claims of cee actors immediately after the end of the Cold 
War was (and still is) that the atrocities of the Nazi regime be treated equally 
with those of Soviet Communism. This argument still causes controversies in 
academic discussions and raises fervent debates among politicians in Europe.
The demand for equal treatment of the Nazi and Soviet regimes is often raised 
by Polish meps in debates in the ep. The main call is for Soviet  Communism 
to be treated in Western European historiography and politics as totalitarian-
ism, as should the crimes committed under this system. The second most often 
raised claim is recognition of the crimes under Soviet Communism as geno-
cide. These claims mostly concern the period of the Second World War and its 
immediate aftermath. However, they also appear in the debate on commemo-
ration of Holodomor in Ukraine before the war. It is also important to note that 
some meps have stressed that these demands do not diminish the significance 
of the Nazi crimes, especially the Holocaust, as sometimes alleged by their 
opponents,43 but rather that the recognition of the criminal  character of any 
42 Neumayer “Integrating”.
43 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
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totalitarian regime makes European societies more immune to its devastating 
effects. Finally, some meps demand recognition of specific crimes against the 
Polish nation which in their opinion are not properly known and commemo-
rated, such as the Katyń massacre. Such claims are also obviously directed to 
the memory politics of Russia. It is important to note that even though some 
meps call for the eu to put pressure on Russia to deal with its past, most of 
them are actually very moderate in their demands toward  Moscow and focus 
rather on the eu and its member states and societies.
These claims are predominantly about ‘inclusion of their [cee societies] 
wartime experiences in the currently West-European bent understanding of 
the implication and ramification of this war’.44 In many meps’ statements, their 
claims have a universalistic, European motivation. As one of them argued, ‘in-
dividual nations had very different experiences of the Second World War, and 
so the debate we are holding today is perhaps the most important debate on 
European identity that has been held for years. If we genuinely wish to join to-
gether to form a single European spiritual community, we must all endeavour 
to gain a full understanding of the historical experiences of Europe’s nations. 
In order to do so, there are certain issues about which we must speak quite 
frankly’.45 According to Polish political actors, a European identity suitable for 
the societies of old and new member states is at stake, as are European values. 
The main motivation expressed for the recognition of the totalitarian nature 
of Soviet Communism is, generally speaking, a  common future in the eu. One 
of the meps from uen argued, ‘The building of a democratic Europe is pos-
sible only on the foundations of truth, including the truth about  anti-human 
communist totalitarianism. We owe remembrance and justice not only to the 
victims of inhuman systems; first of all we owe it to present and future genera-
tions so that this situation does not happen again’.46 Many meps claim that 
this recognition should be granted in order to create a sense of belonging in the 
community. Another frequently raised motivation deals with European values: 
‘The more Europeans know about the true face of  totalitarianism, the better it 
44 Ibid. 2.
45 Wojciech Roszkowski (uen), “The future of Europe sixty years after the Second World 
War”, European Parliament plenary debate (11 May 2005) accessed August 2014, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2
b20050511%2bITEM-016%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN.
46 Mirosław Piotrowski (uen), “Proposed hearing of the Commission on crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by totalitarian regimes” European 
Parliament plenary debate, (21 April 2008), accessed August 2014, http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20080421%2
bITEM-015%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN.
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will be for the future of the European Union. This is not a matter of celebrat-
ing the sufferings of millions of people. It is about understanding the dramatic 
consequences which came from and are still coming from  totalitarian prac-
tices in many countries in Europe. Solidarity, freedom, empathy, toleration, 
dialogue – all of these values look somewhat different if we look at them from 
the perspective of experiences with totalitarianism. Let us remember this’.47
Another interesting aspect of the analysis of Polish meps’ claims is to whom 
they direct their demands. Most often, it is Western Europe in general and its 
societies. Less frequently – and specifically in cases of concrete instruments 
of commemoration – it is eu institutions, especially the European Commis-
sion, that are the addressees of the claims. In a few instances – predominantly 
by meps from centre- and right-wing party groups – the political opponents 
are addressed. Specifically, claims about the totalitarian nature of Soviet Com-
munism are frequently directed to the European Left, whom some right-wing 
meps believe relativizes the crimes of Communism for ideological reasons: 
‘Whoever today relativises the criminal character of totalitarianism, be it Nazi 
or Communist totalitarianism, stands in opposition to the traditions of a coun-
try ruled by law and to democracy. It is, by the way, characteristic that while 
the European Right does not relativise Nazi crimes today, the European Left 
does relativise Communist crimes’.48 However, also voices from the Left itself – 
albeit very few – raise this problem. As a Polish mep from the pes declared: 
‘We are opposed to the manipulation of that memory, and to the insulting of 
that memory, where it is used today in an ideological battle, in a party fight 
in the European political system. We remember the victims. The victims of 
 20th-century totalitarian regimes must be the foundation of today’s democ-
racy in Europe’.49
The claims for recognition of the significance of the crimes of Soviet Com-
munism, especially during the Second World War, serve a double purpose 
for meps from Poland. Firstly, it equates the cee experience with that of 
Western Europe, and therefore combats the Orientalist, essentially colonial 
approach of Western Europeans to this experience.50 As a result, it paves the 
way for an equal position in the eu, making this experience equally  important 
47 Filip Kaczmarek (ppe-de), “European conscience and totalitarianism” European Parlia-
ment plenary debate (25 March 2009) accessed August 2014, http://www.europarl. europa 
.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-010+DOC+XML+ 
V0//EN.
48 Wojciech Roszkowski (uen), “European conscience”.
49 Józef Pinior (pse), “European conscience”.
50 Mälksoo, “The Discourse”.
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and therefore serving the emerging European identity and community of the 
new, united Europe. Secondly, this reaffirms their own identity as fully-fledged 
Europeans and secures their place in the eu. This is also visible in less dra-
matic debates on the experience of living under Communism and fighting its 
system.
The reception of such claims resonates with its prime purpose of  achieving 
an equal position within the community. Frequently the claims are positioned 
as justified. As one of the meps stated: ‘the history of central and eastern 
 Europe is our history. The problem for us British and for us French is that we 
were Stalin’s allies at the end of the War. It took 30 years for the British to ad-
mit that Katyn was a Stalinist crime’.51 It is important to note that especially 
epp politicians used the term of Stalinist totalitarianism in their statements: 
‘Although National Socialist totalitarianism was vanquished in 1945, Stalinist 
totalitarianism divided Europe and imposed its unjust rule on the peoples of 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Hope, though, did not desert the 
less happy survivors of the Second World War – the hope of a shared Europe, 
intellectually, morally and politically renewed, with the prospect of prosperity 
for all its citizens. To this hope they eventually gave shape in a peaceful revolu-
tion, the watchword for which was Solidarnosc’.52 That is consistent with find-
ings of scholars analyzing the process of mnemonic entrepreneurship that was 
especially successful within epp.53
However, representatives for the radical left-wing party group (gue/ngl) 
fiercely opposed during the analyzed debates, not the recognition of Stalin-
ism as totalitarianism, but rather – in the words of an gue/ngl mep – ‘the 
attempt surreptitiously to trivialise Nazism by placing it in a generic category 
that includes, in particular, Stalinism and even the regimes existing in central 
and eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall’.54 Such arguments – 
especially expressed by far left parties – have not changed much over time. 
They were reflected in the interparty conflicts as epp mep stressed: ‘there is 
a further dimension to this debate. It is not only a united Europe that needs 
urgently to look at the entirety of the past, but the same is particularly true of 
the European Left’.55
51 Christopher Beazley (ppe-de), “Proposed hearing”.
52 Hans-Gert Pöttering (ppe-de), “The future of Europe”.
53 Neumayer “Integrating”.
54 Francis Wurtz (gue/ngl), “Proposed hearing”.
55 Gyorgi Schöpflin (ppe-de), “European conscience”.
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 Who Ended the Cold War and Why Does it Matter?
A very frequent claim raised by Polish meps regards the significance of the ex-
perience of the opposition struggles in Poland under Communism for a united 
Europe. This is specifically visible when the Solidarity movement is mentioned 
in the ep. The main argument raised by Polish meps deals with the universality 
of values for which the Solidarity movement fought, as well as their comple-
mentarities with Western European values. The main claim was predominant-
ly about the recognition of Poles as part of the same European family. This 
was – as discussed above – a concurrent theme in the discourse on the eu 
enlargement in Poland. It was mostly about how, due to their religion, history 
and values, Poles belong to the Western European civilization.
One element in statements on the Solidarity movement raised by Polish 
meps seems very interesting in the context of this chapter. It is connected with 
the claim for recognition of the significance of the Solidarity movement and 
its demands from 1980 for global, or at least European, historical processes. Ac-
cording to Polish meps, it was not Hungarian or Czech attempts to overthrow 
the Communist regime, nor the German demolition of the Berlin Wall which 
ultimately ended Communism in cee and the world. It was the Polish Solidar-
ity movement and its unprecedented mobilization of the people that finally 
became decisive. As one of the meps put it, ‘Solidarity was instrumental in 
much more besides. It led to the peaceful revolution in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Nine years after the so-called outbreak of Solidarity, Czechoslovakia 
underwent the Velvet Revolution, and the fall of the Berlin Wall followed. The 
origins of these events can, however, be traced back to 1980 and to Gdansk, in 
Poland’.56 Such a position in the debate signals the need not yet fully expressed 
by Polish meps to be recognized in the Western European family as signifi-
cant actors who contributed greatly to the changes in the continent. Various 
analyses of the Polish discourse on the Second World War highlight the col-
lective trauma of being betrayed, left alone beyond the Iron Curtain. Passiv-
ity is alien to the Polish political and strategic culture since, at least from the 
period of partition, it was always important to act against the will of the stron-
ger, rather than passively wait for a fate which was decided above their heads. 
This resonated in Polish politics in the interwar period and has returned with 
56 Ryszard Czarnecki (ni), “25th Anniversary of Solidarity and its message for  Europe” 
European Parliament plenary debate (26 September 2005) accessed  August 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+ 
20050926+ITEM-013+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
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double strength since 1989.57 The Solidarity movement and its achievements 
are  specifically important because they undo the curse of the Yalta conference. 
One mep made it clear: ‘Attempts had been made previously by the Czechs, 
Slovaks and Hungarians to overthrow that diabolical system, but it was the 
Poles and the Polish Pope who eventually succeeded in dismantling the agree-
ments reached at Yalta’.58
The recognition of the constant Polish fight with Communism, which cul-
minated during the Solidarity period, serves two main purposes for Polish 
meps. First and foremost, as stated above, it is about finding a place in the 
European Community and becoming a fully-fledged member thereof. This is 
done through claiming a strong commitment to the most important values of 
Europe. It is important to stress that the special experience of cee societies 
under Communism, with their then much more caucious attitude towards any 
idealistic, utopian project and yet the particular attention to the individual 
freedom and liberty of which they were long deprived, could  enrich the reflec-
tions on the future of Europe. Secondly, assertions about the contribution of 
Solidarity (and the broader Polish struggles with Communism) to the Euro-
pean peace after the Cold War are connected with redistribution claims. As 
will be discussed in the next part of the paper, assuring an equal place in com-
munity allows demands connected with fair distribution of goods.
The analysis of the reception of such claims confirms that Solidarity occu-
pies an important place in the collective memory of the united Europe and 
that it was strengthened through the Polish political actors’ claims. It has 
also been frequently asserted that the values that the Solidarity movement 
 represented are important for European heritage: ‘Solidarity symbolised then, 
as it does now, hope in the future, the determination of people to build bet-
ter lives for themselves and their families and an unshakeable belief in the 
power of the human spirit’.59 However, the second function of the claims, i.e. 
the redistribution claims finds less response in the analyzed material. In other 
words, Solidarity is widely perceived, in a symbolic sense, as a significant con-
tributor to the European experience. However, it has not yet been translated 
into the acceptance of the right of claimants to demand a different position as 
regards redistribution. That will be further elaborated in the following section 
of the chapter.
57 Góra, Mach, “Between Old Fears”.
58 Jan Masiel (ni), “25th Anniversary”.
59 Timothy Kirkhope (ppe-de), “25th Anniversary”.
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 This is Why You Need to Pay
The claims for the recognition of the experience of Communism also serve 
other purposes. As mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, Nancy 
 Fraser argues that part of the struggles for recognition is the right to be treated 
equally when redistribution is in question. Following this line of argumenta-
tion, some claims for the recognition of the experience of Communism pro-
vide political actors with the necessary instruments to demand either special 
treatment under eu law or to bargain for redistribution.
The case of the Polish shipyards was one of the most difficult and compli-
cated issues. The European Commission stood against the Polish government 
for its non-compliance with competition law since it was heavily subsidizing 
shipyards in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin. At the same time, this particular 
industrial sector occupies a special place in the Polish experience, as these 
were the cradles of opposition against Communist rule, and specifically the 
Solidarity movement. The long negotiations between the ec and Polish gov-
ernment proved to be extremely difficult, and the debate finally entered the 
European Parliament in 2007 and 2008. Ultimately, the ec and Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes decided against the subsidies of the Polish shipyards, arguing that 
state aid was illegal.
Most of the arguments in the debates were of an economic and political 
nature; however, many meps used arguments that pointed to the special char-
acter and symbolic meaning of the shipyards, and therefore the right to spe-
cial treatment of them. As one of the meps stressed, ‘The Gdansk Shipyard, 
the cradle of solidarity, the chief actor in the struggle against communism, a 
 shipyard which suffered discrimination and which by the political decisions of 
the communists was brought to a poor financial condition, today awaits a posi-
tive decision from the European Commission’.60 The crucial argument for the 
anticipated special treatment was that the sector had already been destroyed 
by the Communist economy, and that an attempt to save it was just and ap-
propriate. Moreover, according to some meps, the entire eu owes its current 
well-being and prosperity to the struggle of workers under Communism: ‘Pol-
ish shipyards, particularly the Gdansk shipyard, are a symbol of the struggle 
against the Communist government. They symbolise the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain which had divided Europe in two. That is why the flagpoles, which stand 
outside the European Parliament buildings, and which fly flags of the Member 
60 Elżbieta Tomaszewska (uen), “Reform programme of Polish shipyards” European Par-
liament plenary debate (21 October 2008) accessed August 2014 http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-% 2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20081021%2
bITEM-016%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN.
Magdalena Góra and Zdzisaw Mach - 9789004352353




States, were made in the Gdansk shipyards. It is thanks to the heroic actions of 
Polish shipyard workers, who fought for a re-united Europe, that today we are 
able to meet here together. These people deserve our respect, they deserve a 
dignified life and a decent living’.61
In the discussed debates dealing with the issues of redistribution, the topic 
of the recognition of past experience appears much less frequently. The main 
arguments link the lower level of development in former communist countries 
and the need for greater solidarity with the Cold War division of Europe. In 
special circumstances – such as in the case of the Polish shipyards – the role in 
the historical processes of the continent is perceived as an appropriate justifi-
cation for special treatment in contemporary European politics.
The symbolic significance of shipyards was recognized in the debates al-
though the prime interest was the economic aspects of the conflict. The leader 
of pes stated ultimately that ‘The Polish shipyards, sites such as Gdansk and 
Szczecin, were an important symbol for us all, of the Polish people’s democrat-
ic struggle against dictatorship. That is another reason why these yards must 
not be closed’.62 However, the claims that the experience of Communism and 
its economic heritage could be used as an argument for the non-compliance 
with eu regulations, were not supported. The reception of such claims was 
different predominantly due to the explicit, individual – often clearly eco-
nomic – interest behind the demands. The case of shipyards confirms that, 
as much as there is an economic heritage of Communism with which new 
member states are struggling, it is not widely perceived as an excuse for dif-
ferent treatment.
 Conclusions
The progress of European integration, and also the enlargement in which for-
mer communist countries joined the eu, has created a new, much broader and 
demanding frame of reference within which the European politics of memory 
and recognition can be developed. The European, enlarged space of historical 
debate has also become a frame for the construction of collective identities. 
As identity is a process of dialogue, an interaction with ‘significant others’, an 
involvement in meaningful relations with partners, the enlarged Europe has 
become a place of struggle for the recognition of those who have previously, 
in the divided Europe, not participated in the process of the construction of 
61 Adam Bielan (uen), “Reform programme”.
62 Martin Schultz (pse), “Reform programme”.
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European memory and identity. For Poland and its people, as for other new 
members of the eu, it has become crucial to make themselves heard and re-
spected in their memories and interpretations of the past. The struggle for 
recognition consists in an attempt to introduce new topics into the European 
discourse – those which did not exist before 1989 or were only in the mar-
gins. The demand is that particular national or regional historical experiences 
and memories should become recognized by all Europeans and represented in 
mainstream European narratives. Also, Central and Eastern Europeans have 
tried to win recognition of their interpretations of events and processes which 
already exist in European memory.
It seems – based on our analysis – that the success of the struggle for rec-
ognition depends on whether Central and Eastern Europeans are able to offer 
their own, new interpretation of those issues which are seen as essential for 
the whole of Europe and not only for the region of cee. The key problem here, 
however, is that new members of the eu must, in order to be accepted as equal 
partners in the dialogue, in order to be recognized, speak a language which 
is understood and respected. The concepts, metaphors, symbolic references 
and emotional expressions used in communication create the impression of 
familiarity or alienation. It is therefore important that new members of the 
network of communication know, understand and learn to use the language 
which is seen as the idiom of the European common platform of dialogue. 
Our analysis shows that the plenary sessions of the ep has served as a forum to 
express claims directed to Western Europe in its broadest sense and its societ-
ies. The eu institutions have been much less frequently addressed with such 
claims. Moreover, the main motivations given for such claims have been pre-
dominantly universally European, referring to European values and the future 
of European integration.
In order to be successful in their struggle for recognition, the new member 
states also need to address issues, questions and problems which are impor-
tant for Europe and promise to contribute something to European common 
understanding. Our analysis shows that the new members have been able to 
introduce new topics of discussion which are seen as an important contribu-
tion to the common European heritage. Their voice is heard and their experi-
ence at least partially recognized. In particular, former communist countries 
will be recognized as equal if they can demonstrate not only that the experi-
ence of communism is important for them, but that it is important for the 
whole of Europe. As visible in our analysis, they have rather quickly learnt how 
to frame their demands. The well-being of Europe and the eu, as well as Euro-
pean values and principles, have often been used in the justifications of Polish 
meps and that has resonated well in the ep.
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Finally, we argue that the eu has become – even if only partially – a new 
recognition order for political actors from Poland. It has become a significant 
place for claims related to identity as well as for redistribution. The debates on 
the Polish shipyard sector show how the recognition of historical experience 
can be utilized in political battles to receive special treatment, in this context 
connected with the economic aspects of integration.
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